
























This study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
cash hoarding decision. The study focuses on BIST100 non-financial firms listed on 
Borsa Istanbul over the period from 2010 to 2014. The study finds that firms with 
larger size of board of directors are more likely to hoard cash than firms with smaller 
board size. However, it finds firms with larger size of audit committee are more likely 
to hold less cash than firms with smaller audit committee size. Besides, it finds that 
firms with larger percent of independent directors are more likely to hoard more cash 
than firms with smaller percent of independent directors. It, also, finds that when the 
CEO of a firm is also the chairman, the firm tends to hoard more cash. Further, the 
study finds that firms audited by non-big auditor are more likely to hold more cash 
than firms audited by big auditor. The results suggest that firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms (except for percent of independent directors) are less likely 
to hoard cash.  
 











1. Introduction  
Due to market imperfections, external funds cannot be obtained easily and hoarding cash becomes 
crucial for firms. Firms need cash in order to carry out their financing, investing and operating 
activities. There are number of reasons that encourages firms to hoard cash. First, firms are likely 
to face transaction costs when they raise funds externally. These costs could be avoided by using 
cash reserves. Furthermore, cash reserves eliminate the need of asset liquidation to obtain funds. 
Second, cash reserves could be used in order to finance the investments and keep operating.  Also, 
cash hoardings are beneficial for shareholders. Because, cash hoarding avoid dividend cuts during 
the periods with cash flow shortages (Saddour, 2006). Furthermore, hoarding cash reduce the cash-
flow uncertainty because companies can meet not expected contingencies. JP Morgan (2005) states 
that “The choice of a company to hold cash to meet the objective of ensuring greater levels of 
financial flexibility and so it can capture growth opportunity without the risk of being subject to 
financial constraints”. However, hoarding cash could create conflict of interests between managers 
and shareholders which creates an agency motive.  
There is a limited number of studies that investigates the corporate cash hoarding decisions of 
firms. Prior research has examined the determinates of corporate cash hoarding in number of 
countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, United States, France, Pakistan, Switzerland, 
Germany, Japan, Iran, China and ASEAN Countries. However, none of prior research has 
examined the impact corporate governance mechanisms on cash hoarding in Turkey. Therefore, 
this work is encouraged by the fact that none of the prior studies in Turkey have studied the 
relationship between corporate cash hoarding and corporate governance mechanisms. Prior studies 
in Turkey focus on the period before global financial crises and examine the impact of firm specific 
characteristics such as profitability and capital expenditure on the corporate cash holding (e.g., 
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Uyar & Kuzey, 2014). Thus, this study aims to fill this gap by investigating the effect of specific 
governance mechanisms on the cash hoarding decision of Turkish listed firms, particularly, after 
the period of global financial crisis.  
This study contributes to the literature in terms of corporate cash hoarding and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The study is the first to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the corporate cash hoarding decision within the Turkish firms over the period of 
2010-2014. The study finds that firms with larger size of board of directors are more likely to hold 
more cash than firms with smaller board of directors. In addition, it finds that firms with larger 
percent of independent directors their board of directors are more likely to hold more cash than 
firms with smaller percent of independent directors in their boards. It, also, finds that when the 
CEO of a firm is also the chairman, the firm tends to hold more cash. besides, the results indicate 
that firms with larger size of audit committee are more likely to hold less cash than firms with 
smaller size of audit committee. However, the study finds non-significant relationship between 
cooperate cash hoardings and both frequency of board meetings and family ownership. Further, 
the study finds that firms audited by non-big auditor are more likely to hold more cash than firms 
audited by big auditor. The results suggest that firms with good corporate governance mechanisms 
are less likely to hold cash.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework; 
It explains different theories of cash hoarding and reviews the literature to formulates the research 





2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Theories 
The theoretical expectations for managers’ decision to hold cash are based on the following 
theories; trade-off, pecking order and free cash flow theories  
2.1.1 Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory was, firstly, proposed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) and was extended 
by Miller & Orr (1966). The trade-off theory argues that firms maximize their values by 
considering the marginal costs and marginal benefits of hoarding cash. (Opler et al., 1999). Ferreira 
& Vilela (2004) emphasized that hoarding cash reserves reduces the probability of experiencing 
financial distress, make it possible for a firm to apply optimal investment policy and reduces the 
costs of liquidation of assets or external fundraising. On the other hand, the marginal cost of 
hoarding cash is the opportunity cost of forgone investments with higher returns (Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). In addition, if managers hoard cash in order to increase the firm 
size rather than maximizing shareholder’s wealth, the company could face the agency cost of 
hoarding cash (Han & Qiu, 2007).  
2.1.2 Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order (or financial hierarchy) theory was developed by Myers & Majluf (1984).This 
theory aims to minimize the costs of information asymmetry1 and other costs of financing 
(Custodio et al., 2005; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Thus, this theory suggests that firms follow a 
pecking order of financing to minimize costs related to information asymmetry. Therefore, 
                                                          
1 The term of “asymmetric information” represents the unequal level of information between two parties within a 
transaction and it could be solved by providing information to external environment. Because of asymmetric 
information, markets become inefficient due to insufficient information provided to investors to make their decisions. 
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companies finance their investments, firstly, by using internal sources such as retained earnings, 
then, low risk debt and, finally, with high risk debt rather than using equity financing (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). In addition, when a company become bankrupt, the debt holders are paid first and 
shareholders get the remaining amount. The equity financing is the last choice because firms face 
higher costs due to information asymmetries, when issuing new shares. Thus, cash can be seen as 
an outcome of the different financing and investment decisions proposed by the hierarchal pattern 
of financing (Dittmar et al., 2003). Ferreira and Vilela (2004) claim that cash can be used for 
financing investments to pay firm’s debt and in turn stockpile cash. Dittmar et al. (2003) also detect 
that firms with high level of cash flows are those to distribute dividends, apply for debt financing, 
and as a result hoard cash. 
2.1.3 Free Cash Flow Theory 
The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) mainly focuses on the shareholder-manager 
relationship. Free cash flow is the remaining amount when the capital expenditures are subtracted 
from operating cash flow. According to Jensen (1986), managers desire to increase the firm size 
with the cash hoardings of the company by investing in assets. By doing this, managers gain 
additional power on the investment decisions of the firm. Therefore, cash reserves make it possible 
for managers to make the investments that investors are not willing to finance. Additionally, when 
a firm has enough cash hoardings, it is not required to raise funds externally and provide 
information on their future projects to external environment. This situation allows manager to use 
the cash hoardings in a way that suits their own interest and reduces the pressure for good 
performance (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Custodio et al., 2005). On the other hand, shareholders seek 
to maximize their wealth with dividend pay-outs. Finally, management may choose to hoard cash 
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because of the unwillingness to pay dividends to shareholders. Yet, managers must find ways to 
invest the cash and this behaviour may result in unworthy investments (Opler et al., 1999). 
2.2 Literature and hypotheses development 
This section critically evaluates the prior research in terms of the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and hoarding cash in order to development the research hypotheses.  
2.2.1 Cash hoarding and size of board of directors  
Jensen (1993) suggests that larger boards of directors are more likely to be dominated by CEOs. 
This may be because a number of board members prefers not to criticize the decisions on 
management. Consequently, Boubaker et al. (2013) argue that the size of a board negatively affects 
the co-operation and communication between the board members. This is in turn decreases the 
monitoring quality of the board. In addition, prior research (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Yermack, 1996) emphasize that larger board size is in-effective in making decision. 
Thus, prior research finds that firms with larger board size are more likely to hold excessive cash 
reserves, allows managers to make investments that are benefitable for them, as free cash flow 
theory suggests (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). In addition, Bokpin et al. (2011) find a positive 
relationship between board size and cash hoardings, which may occur because of the willingness 
to pay board remunerations. Prior empirical research documents positive or non-significant 
relationship between board size and the decision to hold cash. For instance, Lee and Lee (2009), 
Bokpin et al. (2011) and Gill and Shah (2012) find positive relationship between the size of board 
of directors and cash hoarding. However, Boubaker et al. (2013) failed to find a significant 




H1: The larger the boar size, the higher the cash value held by firms  
2.2.2 Cash hoarding and Frequency of Board Meetings 
Agency theory argues that board of directors should monitor the managers in order to make sure 
that the interests of managers are in line with the interests of shareholders. (Belkhir, 2009; Dalton 
et al., 2007). Therefore, the process of monitoring the managers is one of the most important duties 
of board of directors. Jiraporn et al. (2009) stated that board meetings have a significance for board 
members to carry out their monitoring process more effectively. In addition, some researches 
revealed that the frequency of board meetings significantly affect the effectiveness of monitoring 
activities of board members (Vefeas, 2000; Ramos and Olalla, 2011; Hsu and Petchskulwong, 
2010). As mentioned before, managers and shareholders of a company are expected to have 
opposite tendencies on the usage of cash hoardings, as agency theory suggests. Managers tend to 
hold the cash in order to be used for their benefit; however, shareholders force them to distribute 
the cash hoardings as dividends. By this reason, the frequency of board meetings is expected to 
affect the effectiveness of monitoring positively, which results in less cash hoardings. However, 
there is a noticeable absence of studies that investigated the relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and the value of cash hoardings. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed 
H2: The higher the frequency of board meetings, the lower the cash hoardings held by 
firms 
2.2.3 Cash hoarding and Board Independence 
Lee and Lee (2009) argued that non-duality of CEO, smaller boards and higher proportion of 
independent directors within the board are the main components of a well-structured board of 
directors. A well-structured board of directors is more able to resist the desires of hoarding more 
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cash reserves by other managers, to pursue their own benefit. Also, because of the absence of any 
financial interest, other than remunerations, independent directors within the board are expected 
to be more objective than other board members (Adams et al., 2010). In addition, independent 
directors mainly compete on their remunerations, which is significantly affected by the 
performance of the firm. By this reason, independent directors are likely to monitor the actions, 
within the company, better than other board members (Yermack, 2004). Improved monitoring 
leads to improved firm performance decreased managerial entrenchment and less business 
opportunism (Lee and Lee, 2009). Also, Kim et al. (2007) emphasized that it is expected for 
independent directors to protect minority shareholders.  
These arguments show that presence of independent directors leads to greater protection of 
minority shareholders, better monitoring on the actions of management and prevention of hoarding 
excessive cash reserve for the benefit of managers and owners. Therefore, board independence is 
expected to affect cash hoardings negatively. Empirically, prior research report mixed results in 
terms of the association between independent directors and cash hoarding. For instance, some prior 
studies find negative association between existence of independent directors in the board and cash 
hoarding (e.g., Lee and Lee 2009; Boubaker et al., 2013). However, Chen and Chuang (2009) 
document positive association between outside directors and cash hoardings. The current study 
suggest that independent directors are likely to monitor the actions, and thus, negative association 
is expected between independent directors and cash hoarding. Therefore, the following is 
developed: 
H3: The higher the percent of independent directors in the board, the lower the cash 
hoardings held by firms  
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2.2.4 Cash hoarding and role duality of CEO  
Free Cash Flow theory argues that when the roles of CEO and chairman are combined, the quality 
of the board is likely to be affected negatively and may result in non-disagreement of the fiduciary 
duty of board members (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 1993). Additionally, the duality role of a 
CEO affects the effectiveness of a board, because the position of CEO is more suitable than other 
board members to obtain special information about the firm (Daily and Dalton, 1997). 
Consequently, the CEOs, who are also the chairman of the company, may prefer not to share 
critical information, due to the desire of self-entrenchment, that is needed for the assessment of 
management quality (Brockmann et al., 2004). Therefore, it is expected for CEO role duality to 
adversely affect the quality of board monitoring, which results in inability to detect the actions 
carried out by board members for their own benefit (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Goyal and Park, 
2002). In addition to these, Gul and Leung (2004) find that the role duality of CEO affect the 
outcome of a firm (e.g., less voluntary corporate disclosures). 
The above arguments suggest that when the CEO is also the chairman of the company, board of 
directors may not be able to resist managerial discretion on the cash hoardings of the firm 
accompanied by concentrated ownership. Additionally, the role duality of CEO allows the 
controlling shareholders to hold higher cash reserves for their own benefit, which supports a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and cash hoardings (Boubaker et al., 2013). Moreover, 
Dahya and Travlos (2000) argue that dual-responsibility encourages CEOs to act in line with the 
interests of managers and hoarding excessive cash reserves help managers to protect their 
positions. Consistently, Boubaker et al. (2013) on French firms and Gill and Shah (2012) on 




H4: Existence of role duality of CEO leads to higher cash hoarding held by firms 
2.2.5 Cash hoarding and Family-control 
Free cash flow theory suggests that when the family hold controls over a firm accompanied with 
excess control rights, family can use the cash in a way that suits family members’ own interest, 
even if it is not benefitable for outside investors (La Porta et al., 1999). Additionally, involvement 
of controlling family members in management increases the discretionary power of family 
members, and combines management and monitoring processes (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Consistently, Kuan et al. (2011) support this argument and emphasize that family-controlled firms’ 
decisions are taken typically by considering the wants and needs of family members, with the help 
of less monitoring by minority shareholders. These arguments result in non-detection of business 
opportunism. Based on these arguments, family-controlled firms are expected to hoard more cash 
in order to pursue their own interest, without maximizing shareholder wealth. This positive 
relationship is supported by Liu et al. (2015). On the other hand, Kuan et al. (2012) show that the 
relationship between family-control and cash hoardings is non-monotonic. They find that in low 
cash hoarding firms, family member CEOs tend to hold more cash than outsider CEOs. However, 
in high cash hoarding firms, family member CEOs are found to hold less cash than outsider CEOs 
(Kuan et al., 2012). Furthermore, Boubaker et al. (2013) reveal that, in well- governed firms, the 
relationship between family-control and cash hoardings is negative, which shows that the board of 
well-governed firms could resist the attempts to hold high cash reserves. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is developed 
H5: Existence of family control leads to higher cash hoarding held by firms 
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2.2.6 Cash hoarding and size of audit committee  
Agency theory suggests that the conflicts between managers and shareholders, generally, results 
in decisions that meets with the interests of top managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
decisions against the shareholders’ interests are more common when the monitoring quality is low 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). In order to improve the monitoring quality of the board and resolve these 
conflicts, audit committee has a critical role (Klein, 2002). Anderson et al. (2004) emphasize that 
the responsibilities of audit committees include monitoring the internal control, which enhances 
the reliability of financial reports. In addition, MeMullen (1996) show that there are fewer 
shareholder lawsuits, regarding the conflicts between agents and shareholders, for the companies 
with audit committees. 
The size of an audit committee can affect its effectiveness. The report of Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999) suggests a minimum number of three members for the audit committees. The firms with 
small audit committees are expected to suffer from ineffective monitoring due to limited skills and 
knowledge (Al-Matar et al., 2014). On the other hand, relatively larger audit committees have an 
advantage of diversified knowledge base (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), which improves the 
quality of monitoring. However, when the audit committees become too large its effectiveness are 
expected to face diffusion of responsibility and process losses (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
There is a noticeable absence of studies that investigated the relationship between the size of the 
audit committees and cash hoardings. However, the firms with relatively larger audit committees 
are likely to have better monitoring, due to aforementioned factors, which results in less cash 
hoardings. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed 
H6: The larger the audit committee size, the lower the cash hoardings held by Turkish firms  
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3. Research design  
3.1 Empirical model  
In order to investigate our hypotheses, the study controls for some economic environment variables 
that may affect the value of a firm cash hoarding. These variables include: firm age, size, 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividends, and capital expenditure. Besides, there may be a 
variation in the value of cash held by firms over the sample period. Therefore, the year-fixed effect 
is used to control for variations in the cash hoarding value over the sample period. Finally, industry 
fixed effect is used to control for variations in the value of cash hoardings among different 
industries. The following summarizes the empirical model (Model 1) and Table (1) elaborates the 
definitions and measurements of the variables. 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑖𝑡 +




𝛽0  The regression intercept  
𝛽1….. 𝛽13 The regression coefficients  
𝜀 The error term  
 
Table (1): Variables: Definitions and measurements 
 
Variable Label Measurement 
Cash hoarding CASH 
The natural logarithm value of ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets 
Board size BSIZE The number of directors on the firm board of 
directors  
Board Meetings BMEET 
The frequency of board meetings board meetings 






The percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of directors in a firm board of directors . 
CEO duality DUALITY 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the 
chairman and CEO is the same and 0 otherwise. 
Family control FMLY 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if family-
owned shares are more than or equal to 10% and 
takes the value of 0 if family-owned shares are less 
than 10%.  
Size of the 
Audit 
Committee 
ADTCMT The number of members of a firm audit committee 
Firm age FA 
The number of years passed from firms’ foundation 
to the measurement year 
Firm size FS The natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
Profitability FPRFT 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by 
total assets 




Net working capital minus cash and cash equivalents 
divided by total assets 
Leverage FLEVG Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Dividends FDIVDNT 
If dividends paid =1 
If not= 0 
Capital 
expenditures 
FCAPEX The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
Notes: This Table provides the definitions and measurements of variables in model (1). 
 
3.2 Sample selection and data collection  
Our investigation focuses on BIST100 listed Turkish firms listed on Borsa Istanbul. The analysis 
covers a period from 2010 to 2014. This is because there are noticeable absence of studies in terms 
of cash hoarding after the period of financial crises (e.g., 2009). Following prior research (e.g., 
Bates et al., 2009) financial firms2 are excluded due to their unique motivates for hoarding cash. 
Besides, we exclude firms with missing data in terms of corporate governance variables. This 
                                                          
2 Financial firms include banks, insurance companies, real estate investment trusts (REITs) and investment funds 
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screaming leaves us with 360 firm-year observations. Table (1) shows the final sample sorted by 
years and industries.   
 
All financial data are collected from DataStream database. Corporate governance data are collected 
manually from the Public Disclosure Platform (www.kap.gov.tr) and annual reports of firms. 
Annual reports are collected from companies’ official websites and Public Disclosure Platform 
(www.kap.gov.tr). 
Table (2): Sample selection and allocation over years and industry  
 
Panel A: Sample distribution over years  
Years  Freq. Percent 
2010  72 20 
2011  72 20 
2012  72 20 
2013  72 20 
2014 72 20 
Total  360 100 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution over industries  
Industries  Freq. Percent 
Manufacturing  181 46.94 
Electricity, oil and gas  22 6.11 
Technology  15 4.17 
Consumer services 67 21.94 
Transportation and Telecommunication 32 8.89 
Construction and public works 23 6.39 
Mining  20 5.56 
Total  360 100 
Notes: This Table provides the distribution of the sample among years and industries. Our sample consists of 
360 firm-year observations distributed over 5 years period (2010-2014) and 7 industries. 
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4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are exhibited in table (3). Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics of the continuous variables. While panel b reports the frequencies of dummy variables. 
Panel A of table 3 reports a mean value of logarithm of cash hoarding ratio of -1.109 for Turkish 
firms. The natural logarithms of cash hoardings are between the range of -4.063 and -0.133 with a 
standard deviation of 0.558. These values indicate that the range of cash ratios is considerably 
wide, however, the deviation from the mean value is not high.  
In terms of corporate governance variables, Panel A of table 3 reports that the average board size 
of board of directors is 9 (8.4) members with the maximum board size of 15 members and 
minimum size of 4 members. The average frequency of board meetings of the board of directors 
is 1.232 meetings with minimum number of meeting of 1 meeting and maximum number of 3 
meetings. The mean ratio of independent board members to the total number of board members is 
17%. Because there is an absence of governance regulation in Turkish firms during 2010 & 2011, 
most of the companies did not included independent directors in their boards, during the years of 
2010 and 2011. Therefore, the minimum value for board independence is 0% particularly in 2010 
& 2011. This situation makes it possible to evaluate the effect of independent board members on 
the cash levels of the firms. In terms if audit committee, the average number of members of audit 
committee is 3 (2.2) members with minimum number of member os 1 and maximum number of 7 
members.  
Panel b of table 3 reports the frequencies of dummy variables. Panel b shows that only at 16.4% 
of the CEOs in the sample firms act as chairman in the board of directors. This relatively small 
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percent indicate that CEO-Chairman duality is not a common practice in the Turkish listed firms. 
In terms of family ownership, 33.3% of Turkish firms are owned by family members. During our 
sample period, 70.8% of the firms pay dividends to their shareholders. While, 29.2% did not pay 
any dividends during this period. In terms of auditor type, 83.1% of the firms are audited by one 
of the big auditing firms, while, only 16.9% are audited by non-big auditor.  
Table (3): Descriptive statistics of variables 
  
Panel A: Descriptive - Continues variables  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cash Hoarding (CASH) -1.109 0.558 -4.063 -0.133 
Cash/Total assets  0.133 0.123 0.000 0.736 
Board size  8.406 2.262 4.000 15.000 
Board meetings  1.232 0.491 1.000 3.000 
Board independence  0.179 0.151 0.000 0.429 
Audit committee  2.278 0.725 1.000 7.000 
Firm age  38.569 14.456 11.000 78.000 
Firm size  9.316 0.636 7.677 11.363 
Firm profitability  0.082 0.084 -0.195 0.518 
Liquidity 0.044 0.170 -0.398 0.644 
Firm leverage 0.483 0.224 0.026 1.039 
Capital expenditure [CAPEX] 0.069 0.062 0.000 0.437 
 
Panel B: Frequencies- Dummy variables 
Variable Dummies Freq. Percent 
CEO duality  
0 301 83.6 
1 59 16.4 
Family ownership  
0 240   66.7 
1 120 33.3 
Dividends payment  
0 105   29.2 
1 255 70.8 
Auditor  
0 61   16.9 
1 299 83.1 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of continues variables in Panel A. While Panel B reports the 
frequencies of dummy variables.  




Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix which is used to measure the strength and direction 
of the linear association between any pair of variables. It provides evidence that the value of 
hoarding cash is positively correlated with firm family control, firm age, firm size, firm 
profitability and firm dividends. However, the cash hoarding value is negatively associated with 
firm liquidity and firm leverage. These findings indicate that the management decision to hold 
cash is affected by firm corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics.  
 In addition to measuring the strength and direction of the linear association between any pair of 
variables, the Pearson correlation matrix is an initial tool to detect multi-collinearity. Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) indicate that variables are highly correlated if the correlation is greater than 0.80. 
Consequently, the multi-colinearity among variables is acceptable if the correlation coefficients 
are less than 0.80. Table 4 presents Pearson correlation matrix among dependent and all 
explanatory variables of the current study. The Pearson correlation coefficients among all variables 
are relatively low, less than 0.80, suggesting that there is no variable exhibit multi-collinearity 
problem.  
Further check for multi-collinearity is performed by calculating the tolerance coefficients among 
variables (alternatively, Variance Inflation Factor or simply VIF), after carrying out the regression 
model. Statistically, the higher the correlation among variables, the higher the possibilities of the 
tolerance coefficients will approach to zero and the higher the possibilities to have multi-
collinearity problem. If the tolerance of any variable is less than 0.1 (alternatively, VIF is more 
than 10), this suggests a multi-collinearity problem (Field, 2009). The values of tolerance and VIF 




Table (4): Correlation matrix  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) CASH 1.000       
       
              
(2) Board size  
.029 1.000             
.578              
(3)board meeting  
-.048 -.005 1.000            
.363 .922             
(4)independent  
.033 .019 .039 1.000           
.528 .723 .468            
(5)duality  
-.004 -.199 -.057 -.033 1.000          
.935 .000 .281 .528           
(6) family  
.132 -.088 -.051 .055 -.138 1.000         
.012 .096 .335 .295 .009          
(7)audit committee 
.086 .082 .071 -.159 .048 -.162 1.000        
.108 .125 .185 .003 .369 .002         
(8) age  
.169 .083 -.049 .080 -.110 -.128 -.065 1.000       
.001 .116 .352 .132 .037 .015 .223        
(9)size  
.104 .276 .114 .195 -.172 .136 .066 .066 1.000      
.049 .000 .032 .000 .001 .010 .216 .210       
(10) return  
.243 -.081 .009 -.054 -.101 .112 -.018 -.005 -.129 1.000     
.000 .126 .872 .304 .056 .033 .739 .930 .015      
(11) liquidity  
-.105 -.039 -.058 -.036 -.022 -.175 .016 .113 -.512 .202 1.000    
.047 .457 .274 .497 .680 .001 .758 .032 .000 .000     
(12) leverage  -.160 .240 .026 .067 .006 -.023 .014 -.102 .380 -.235 -.432 1.000   
.002 .000 .621 .203 .910 .657 .789 .052 .000 .000 .000    
(13) dividends .307 .034 -.023 .019 -.162 .091 -.009 .239 .147 .253 .078 -.161 1.000  
.000 .520 .666 .718 .002 .086 .867 .000 .005 .000 .141 .002   
(14) capital 
expenditure  
-.067 .005 .084 .000 .108 .055 .031 -.192 -.087 .167 -.103 .016 -.075 1.000 
.208 .926 .115 .995 .041 .295 .564 .000 .099 .001 .051 .756 .154  
Notes: This Table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix among all variables.  
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2).  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively.  
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4.2 Empirical results  
Table (5) reports the multivariate results which are robust to year and industry fixed effects. The 
empirical results reveal that model (1) is statistically significant at 1% level of significance (P<.01) 
and the adjusted R-squared value 18.8%. These values imply a good overall model fit which 
indicate that the model explains some variation in cash hoarding. 
The empirical results report the coefficient of board size (BSIZE) is 0.036 and is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level (t = 2.547). This result indicates that hoarding cash is 
positively associated with size of board of directors, meaning that firms with larger board of 
directors are more likely to hold more cash than firms with smaller board of directors. Therefore, 
hypothesis H1 is accepted. This result is consistent with the free cash flow theory which suggests 
that larger boards of directors are more likely to have poor communication and cooperation, 
decrease in monitoring quality and ineffective decision making. These factors reduce the pressure 
for good performance, and encourages managers to stockpile more cash to be used for their own 
interests. The results are, also, consistent with some prior research (e.g., Lee & Lee, 2009; Bokpin 
et al., 2011; Gill & Shah, 2012). 
The coefficient of board meetings (BMEET) is -0.020 and is not statistically significant at any 
significance level. This result indicates that hoarding cash is not associated with frequency of board 
of directors’ meetings. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is rejected. The coefficient of board independence 
(BIND%) is 0.928 and is statistically significant at the 5% significance level (t = 2.111). This result 
indicates that hoarding cash is positively associated with the percent of independent directors in 
the board of directors, meaning that firms with larger percent of independent directors their board 
of directors are more likely to hold more cash than firms with smaller percent of independent 
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directors in their boards. Therefore, hypothesis H3 is rejected. This result is consistent with Chen 
and Chuang (2009) who document positive association between outside directors and cash 
hoardings. However, it is not consistent with some studies which find negative association between 
existence of independent directors in the board and cash hoarding (e.g., Lee and Lee 2009; 
Boubaker et al., 2013). 
The coefficient of CEO duality (DUALITY) is 0.059 and is statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level (t = 2.081). This result indicates that hoarding cash is positively associated with 
the role duality of CEO, meaning that firms with existence of role duality of CEO are more likely 
to hold more cash than firms with nonexistence of role duality of CEO. Therefore, H4 is accepted. 
The result suggests that when the CEO of a firm is also the chairman, the firm tends to hold more 
cash. This finding supports free cash flow theory and the findings of some prior research such as 
Gill and Shah (2012) and Boubaker et al. (2013). 
The coefficient of family control (FMLY) is 0.099 and is not statistically significant at any 
significance level. This result indicates that hoarding cash is not associated with family ownership 
Therefore, hypothesis H5 is rejected. The result is not consistent with Liu et al. (2015) who find 
that hoarding cash is positively associated with family ownership. The coefficient of size of audit 
committee (ADTCMT) is -0.084 and is statistically significant at the 5% significance level (t = -
2.549). This result indicates that hoarding cash is negatively associated with the size of audit 
committee, meaning that firms with larger size of audit committee are more likely to hold less cash 
than firms with smaller size of audit committee. Therefore, H4 is accepted. The result suggests 
that firms with relatively larger audit committees are likely to have better monitoring, due to 
aforementioned factors, which results in less cash hoardings. 
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In terms of control variables, firm age is positively associated with the value of cash hoarding at 
5% significance level suggesting that older firms hold more cash than newly established firms. In 
addition, there is an insignificant relationship between firm size and cash hoardings meaning that 
the size of a firm has no effect on the value of cash hoarding. In addition, firm profitability affects 
cash hoardings positively suggesting that firms with higher profitability level are more likely to 
hold more cash than firms with lower profitability level. Also, firm liquidity affects cash hoardings 
negatively and firm leverage has a significant negative effect on cash hoardings. Besides, firm 
dividends affect cash hoardings positively and firm capital expenditures affects cash hoardings 
negatively. These results suggest that the value of cash hoarding is affected by some firm specific 
characteristics.  





























































































Year fixed effect  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  
F-test 5.772*** 
Adjusted R- squared (%) 18.8 
No. of observations  360 
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients estimate of model (1). The dependent variable is CASH 
measured using the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets at the end of 
the year. The t-statistics and tolerance are presented in parentheses. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Table (1). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
 
4.3 Additional analysis 
It is argued that big auditing firms provide higher quality audit compared to their counterparts 
because of their reputation, scale and expertise and they detect more of accounting irregularities 
in order to protect their valuable reputation. These arguments suggest that the big audit firms are 
more likely able to detect business opportunism on cash hoardings. Furthermore, trade-off theory 
suggests auditing reduces the information asymmetry between managers and investors by 
providing assurance for the financial statements. Accordingly, high-quality audits reduce 
information asymmetry to a relatively lower levels. Accordingly, firms audited by one of the big 
auditing firms are likely to have less information asymmetry costs when raising funds externally. 
By this reason, these companies are expected to hold less cash in order to mitigate the opportunity 
cost of hoarding cash, as suggested by trade-off theory.  
However, there is a noticeable absence of studies that investigated the relationship between auditor 
choice and cash hoardings. Therefore, in this section we investigate the impact of audit firm size 
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on cash hoarding. To this end, the sample is divided into two sub-samples: firms audited by one 
of the Big 4 auditing firms (Big-N) and firms audited by a non-Big 4 auditor (Non-Big-N)3. Model 
(1) is run, separately, for the Big-N and Non Big-N Samples. 
Table (6) reports the estimation of Model (1) for the Big N and non-big N samples I panels 1 & 2, 
respectively. The model is statistically significant at 1% for both samples. The adjusted R-squared 
value is 24.5% for the big N sample. This suggest that corporate governance explains 24.5% of 
the variations of cash hoarding when firms are audited by big auditor. While, adjusted R-squared 
value is 31.8% for the non-big N sample. This suggests that corporate governance explains 31.8% 
of the variations of cash hoarding when firms are audited by non-big auditor. Consequently, we 
can argue that firms audited by non-big auditor are more likely to hold more cash than firms 
audited by big auditor. The result is consistent with the trade-off theory which argue that firms 
audited by one of the big auditing firms are likely to have less information asymmetry costs when 
raising funds externally. By this reason, these companies are expected to hold less cash in order to 
mitigate the opportunity cost of hoarding cash.  
Table (6): Big N vs non Big-N auditors  
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3 The Big-N are the four largest international professional services networks, offering audit, assurance, tax, consulting, 
advisory, actuarial, corporate finance, and legal services: wh PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. Non Big-N 
are all auditors other than the Big-N. We measure audit firm size as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is 


















































































































Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
F-test 6.587*** 2.560*** 
Adjusted R- squared (%) .245 .318 
No. of observations  293 57 
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients estimate of model (1) for Big N and non-Big N samples. The dependent variable is CASH 
measured using the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets at the end of the year. The t-statistics 
and tolerance are presented in parentheses. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Table (1). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
5. Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the corporate cash 
hoarding. The study uses a sample from Borsa Istanbul over the period of 2010-2014. the study 
adopts regression analysis with year and industry fixed effects to test the research hypotheses. The 
study finds that firms with larger size of board of directors are more likely to hold more cash than 
firms with smaller board of directors. In addition, it finds that firms with larger percent of 
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independent directors their board of directors are more likely to hold more cash than firms with 
smaller percent of independent directors in their boards. It, also, finds that when the CEO of a firm 
is also the chairman, the firm tends to hold more cash. besides, the results indicate that firms with 
larger size of audit committee are more likely to hold less cash than firms with smaller size of audit 
committee. However, the study finds non-significant relationship between cooperate cash 
hoardings and both frequency of board meetings and family ownership. Further, the study finds 
that firms audited by non-big auditor are more likely to hold more cash than firms audited by big 
auditor. The results suggest that firms with good corporate governance mechanisms are less likely 
to hold cash. 
this study has some limitations that can be considered potential areas for future research. First, the 
covered period is only five years. Considering longer time series period may be an avenue for 
future research which may provide indication on the cash hoarding behavior. Second, the study 
focuses only on cash hoarding in Turkish firms. Other countries, however, could have different 
approaches for hoarding cash. Investigating corporate cash hoarding in other countries, such as 
Germany or Gulf countries, could be useful in understanding the behavior of corporate cash 
hoarding.  Third, the study uses limited number of corporate governance mechanisms. Considering 
other mechanisms such as existence of experience in audit committee or/and other ownership 
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